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Primer of Intellectual Freedom. Edited by Howard Mumford Jones. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949. Pp. xv, '9'. 82.75.
In one sense it would be difficult not to be enthusiastic about this book. It is
an anthology" of important writings on free speech and intellectual freedom in
the Anglo-American tradition, and thus poses for review purposes something of
the problems that, I imagine, would be raised by a new edition of Hamlet.
Would one comment once again on Hamlet or merely on the advances made in
the new edition over prior editions?
The editing achievements can, I think, be disposed of quickly. It is perhaps
unfortunate that the small but useful function of gathering well-known and
fairly accessible items and putting them conveniently and inexpensively under
a single cover has to appear, because of modern publishing habits, in the format
of a name book. In any event Professor Jones has kept his role to a minimum.
He has selected fifteen items, edited them slightly, added one paragraph introductions that are largely a statement of the factual occasion calling forth the
particular item, and has introduced the book with a short popularized statement of the issues today, which is dated happily July 4, 1949. The items are arranged in reverse chronological order starting with five very current items and
going back through time to Bacon. I can offhand think of no persuasive reason
for this sequence since one of the fascinations of such a compilation is to listen
for the echoes of the early writers in the contemporary rhetoric. Perhaps it was
the desire to catch the reader's attention with the immediacy of the issues.
Finally Professor Jones has added the title and thus leaves as a challenge the
label, Primer;if these are the materials for a primer on intellectual freedom we
can only hope that some day Professor Jones will indicate what would be the
content of the advanced courses.
The selection of the materials is good. There are the inevitable Milton, Jefferson, Mill, Holmes, and Chafee and these occupy close to half of the total
pages. There is the interesting essay of Walter Bagehot, The Metaphysical Basis
of Toleration.There are the five current statements; that of Chancellor Hutchins
before the Broyles Commission needs no recommendation in these quarters, and
that of Grenville Clark in answering an irate Harvard alumnus is also good to
have preserved in book form.
Finally there are three essays somewhat tangential to the political theme of
' Professor Jones, who is a member of the English faculty at Harvard, calls his volume a
casebook. This may suggest something about the pervasive influence of Langdell at Harvard
in 1949-
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free speech, but within Professor Jones' title. John Morley's IntellectualResponsibility andPoliticalSpiritcenters on the responsibility of the individual to himself
to think matters through regardless of the advisability of voicing them or of the
impracticality of realizing them in action. A chapter from Karl Pearson's Grammar of Science is exuberant about the potentialities of free scientific inquiry and
defends it vigorously against its chief enemy, which turns out not to be the state
or society, but metaphysics and philosophy. And the first piece in the sequence
is an excerpt from Bacon's Advancement of Learning in praise of the dignity of
learning, a refrain which Milton picks up in defending, as part of his argument,
the utility of promiscuous and wide reading. Thus, the reader is likely to find
along with several old friends some items he has not hitherto read and will be
grateful for.
Any such collection necessarily leaves out items others would have included.
My own chief regrets are the absence of Socrates, Thoreau, Brandeis, and, assuming publishing amenities would have permitted use of so recent a book,
Meikeljohn. And it might have been well if Professor Jones had seen fit to include a few men less enthusiastic about the merits of free speech.
While the content of the book is thus not quite limited to the political aspects
of free speech, Professor Jones makes clear that he intends the book as a touchstone on issues of the day such as the Un-American Activities Committee, the
Communist teacher, and legislation against subversives. Although there appears
to have been too much effort to give the book a contemporary and topical look,
it will serve well its avowed purpose. And it will do more, since the abiding value
of any such collection is in its invitation to think through again its problem.
It is here that the book has special relevance to the lawyer and the student
of law. It can stand being said again that the one specialty all lawyers should
have is that in the basic civil liberties, and of these free speech is perhaps the first.
It is questionable whether any law school has as yet given the matters a sufficiently central place in its curriculum. In fact the free speech issue is in many
ways a touchstone too for issues of legal education. It compels the conclusion
that matters other than those judged by the incidence of litigation or the current interests of the bar, imporfant as these are, must be prominently included.
It affords an easily accessible instance of how a legal problem integrates with
other disciplines, such as those of Mill, Milton, Bagehot. It affords an equally
good instance of how the legal problem almost imperceptibly slides into questions of society pressures and of sanctions other than those of the state. And
at a time when we are jittery about explicit value judgments, it suggests that we
can, however mysterious or unsatisfactory the value making process may appear to be when viewed abstractly, find on particular issues such as this rational,
or at least deeply satisfying, preferences.
The lawyer and the law are also in a position to make an essential contribution to free speech, one suggested by the limitations both of this treatment and
Mr. Meikeljohn's. I do not mean the great practical contribution of being the

556

TIE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

spokesman at critical times as was Mr. Hughes or Mr. Willkie. I mean simply
that the legal experience adds something to the theoretical problem itself. First,
it adds a note of conservatism because to the lawyer the line between speech
and action does not appear so firm; it is no accident that the clear and present
danger formula has its roots in notions of attempt in criminal law. But, second,
it adds a compensating caution about the wisdom of regulation through law
since it is the lawyers' special province to realize that there are special difficulties
in framing laws with precision in this area, that speech is more ambiguous than
action, that a "penumbra" theory of legislation should not apply to basic liberties, and that not only are laws regulating speech too likely to catch persons
other than those intended, but also they are too likely to deter persons other
than those intended. Finally it is only in the day to day experience of the law
that the complexities of application of the principle are felt whether it be an issue
of obstructing the draft, obscenity, teaching the overthrow of government by
force, postal subsidies, sound trucks, group defamation, contempt, picketing,
regulation of radio, fighting words, the Taft-Hartley affidavit, or immigration.
It is the lawyer too who should report to the community on the current scope
of constitutional protection. The fact that the basic free speech precedents are
not scrutinized often enough by the hard headed technicians has perhaps occasioned undue applause as to the probable meaning of the judicial tradition. In
this connection Mr. Meikeljohn's challenge to "clear and present danger" was
most salutary 2 I do not think that a dispassionate reading of the Supreme
Court precedents, read as other cases are read, affords any grounds for great
congratulation on the way the First Amendment has withstood fre.3
This is not the place for an analysis of the complexities of free speech today,
but the materials in the book, of course, raise a host of considerations that press
for attention. Is the issue of the wisdom of regulating speech simply the issue of
regulating any conduct or does speech demand an immunity from regulation
not claimed for other conduct? And if so, what is the distinctive characteristic
of speech? The best answer, I think, is found in Mill's refutation of the argument that regulation of speech carries no greater assumption of infallibility
than does the regulation of anything else. Do we believe that truth wins out in
a fair fight; and if we do not claim to know whether it does or not, can we still
defend free speech? Is Bagehot right that once force is brought in we substitute
a game of chance for a game of logic? Can free speech be analyzed apart from a
political theory, in particular a theory of democracy?4 Must we be making some
2 Mr. Chafee makes an effective defense of the test and Justice Holmes and Mr. Chafee.
Review of Meikeljohn, Free Speech: And its Relationship to Self Government, 62 Harv. L.
Rev. 891 (1949).
31 doubtwhether even Mr. Chafee's superb book corrects this, although it is a first rate legal
analysis. Mr. Chafee's enthusiasm for Holmes is so contagious, his sense of how much worse
things could be and have been is so perceptive, and his style is so delightful, that we end up
feeling very good about the whole thing.
4 It is a strength of Mr. Meikeljohn's analysis that the case for free speech is directly tied
to a theory of self-government. And Mill and Bagehot seem to have had a similar dependence
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assumptions about the minimum intelligence and good will of the audience
which is to be allowed to hear; and if so, do not all positions on free speech turn
on the size of the elite that is permitted to hear everything? Does not a totalitarian government also use a clear and present danger test? Is the case for free
speech ultimately that it is a necessary evil, or is error itself of affirmative value?
Is not the controversy in a particular instance more about the degree of danger
in that instance than about the degree of danger demanded by the principle?
The last question suggests one final and disturbing point. Why are the defenses of free speech, even the coolest of them, so rhetorical?s The point is disturbing because it suggests that this apparently secure value judgment may be
hard pressed after all. It arises perhaps from the familiar dilemma that no one
seeks to protect all speech, and yet we wish to give it a significantly distinctive
degree of protection. In the attempt to protect our ]position from those felt to be
less tolerant, there is the disposition to retreat into epigram and exhortation in
stating the principle and the tendency to win handily all cases except those
which in fact arise.
This book, however modest the editorial task it performs, is welcome and
useful because it makes more accessible important materials on what will always be one of the best of issues.
HARRY KALVEN, JR.*

Courts on Trial. By Jerome Frank. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1949. Pp. xii, 441. $5.00.

A few years ago, a learned layman asked a serious-minded lawyer friend if he
could give him a quick definition of the "judicial process." The lawyer obliged
by defining it as "the ascertainment of the facts in a legal dispute, and finding
and applying to them the appropriate rule of law." "That," countered the layman, with a facetious twinkle, "is 50% more than one of your distinguished colleagues would care to admit. For I have just finished reading Jerome Frank's
Law and the Modern Mind in which he contends that the 'rule of law' is always
so uncertain that it can never be found. Therefore, I take it, the 'judicial process' is just the ascertainment of 'facts'!"
I wonder what the layman would say if he read Jerome Frank's latest book,
Courts on Trial,in which it is now contended that facts in a legal dispute are so
uncertain that they can never really be found. "My goodness," he might be
in mind. On the other hand Milton is able to make a brilliant defense without recourse to the
role of speech in the democratic process, despite the fact that he appears to regard the mass of
mankind unflatteringly. Chafee questions whether Meikeljohn does not push this so far as to
undermine the protection of scientific and artistic speech, which is without political significance.

5The Areopagitica remains the arsenal for rhetorical arguments. We find repeated today
such refrains as that we are copying our enemies; the regulation is an insult to the country,
the youth, the teaching profession; the regulation is impractical; that a first step here will lead
at once to a hundred others, etc.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.

